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Somé things never change. 90 years after the Treaty of Trianon the 
trauma it caused still lives on and may be seen as the seed of animosity 
and new confrontations among the countries iiving in the Central 
European area. Since post-Trianon Hungary has been the subject of most 
scholarly work in recent years, it is all the more important to learn about 
the historic period prior to it, so that we might gain somé further 
perspective on issues involved. Gaining added knowledge about World 
War I can bring us to a closer understanding of Trianon as well. Tibor 
Glant’s book, as he formulates it in the foreword, wishes to “dismantle 
myths,” of which there are quite a few. (23) His work, based on twenty 
years of research, deals with one of the outright distorted versions of 
socialist history in Hungary after World War II: the relations between 
Hungary and the United States during World War I, His purpose with the 
extended Hungárián version of his book is to fill the vacuum that exists 
between the documented history and the analyses of relations of the two 
countries.1
The original of the book came out ten years before the Hungárián version. Tibor Glant. 
Through the Prism o f  the Habsburg Monarchy: Hungary in American Diplomacy and 
Public Opinion During the First World War (Social Science Monographs: War and 
Society in East Central Europc vol. XXXVI. Highland Lakcs, NJ : Atlantic Studics on 
Society in Change, Atlantic Research and Publications Inc., 1998. xx + 372 p.)
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The social upheavals in Hungary following the armistice in the fali 
of 1918 and the infamous Treaty of Trianon of 1920 have served as the 
usual focal point fór studies on relations between the two countries, of 
which Hungary did nőt exist as a single entity up until the conclusion of 
the World War. Bút the antecedents are just as important. The book deals 
with a score of prominent fígures, including nőt only the usual suspects 
such as Woodrow Wilson, Colonel House, George Creel, Count Albert 
Apponyi (Glant’s favorité Hungárián politician of the period), or Mihály 
Károlyi, bút somé lesser known persons that make the picture a whole, 
including Alexander (Sándor) Konta, Róza Bédy-Schwimmer, Jenő 
Bagger-Szekeres, or Mór Cukor. Through these people the author amply 
illustrates the importance of personality in diplomacy.
In the beginning of the book he summarizes the history of the views 
the two nations held about the other on the eve of the war: Americans 
thought of Hungarians as the land of hussars and nobles with a conspicuous 
vein of romanticism, and alsó as the land of Kossuth: whereas Hungarians 
held the view that the United States was the land of (economic) 
opportunity. As the author sums up, the four main factors in shaping the 
view about Hungarians were “the Kossuth myth, contemporary Hungárián 
politics, the American view of the immigrants, and the opinions of those 
Americans who had been to Hungary,” bút “romantic stereotypes” defined 
these views, which Glant calls “comfortable disinterestedness ” (55, 58, 59) 
One of the main strengths of this (and other) chapters is the depth of 
sources provided about the emerging subjects, a trait that can be seen in 
Glant’s other works as well.
The chapter called “Diplomacy” casts an important light on the 
issue of relations. Up to the very last weeks of the war, there were no 
explicit American-Hungarian affairs, and nőt much afterward either. This 
should come as no surprise, since Hungary was part of the Monarchy; 
therefore, it had no possibility to act as a sovereign nation. As it turns out, 
nor did it really want to. The tragedy was that by the time it almost 
decided to take such a course, nearly everybody had turnéd against it and 
the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the 
mutilation of Hungary became a foregone conclusion. As Glant points 
out, the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was a 
concept that only gradually gained shape and, in many ways, was an 
outgrowth of the events on the battlefíeld. The Slavic and Románián 
minorities carried out ever-more effective propaganda warfare and 
through antipathy, the belief in self-determination, and secret treaties,
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Britain and Francé accepted the idea that the Monarchy had to disappear 
and the losers must be punished.
Although the United States did nőt wish to see Hungary shorn of its 
ethnic blocs, because it understood the possible long-term repercussions, 
the successor States had a clear advantage over their old foe. President 
Wilson just could nőt go back on his main principle, self-determination. 
The new Czechoslovak, Románián, and Yugoslav (Serb-Croat-Slovene 
Kingdom) States were all beneficiaries of policies that only sowed the 
seeds of future conflicts, conflicts that are still present. Thus, it is no 
wonder that Károlyi or Apponyi were rendered to an insignificant and 
unsuccessful role in the unfolding drama. In 1918 the anti-Hungárián 
voices gained ground, largely thanks to the successful work of the Slavic 
minorities working on propaganda in the United States. The chapter on 
propaganda shows that the strongest such activity was carried out by the 
British, often fór the Slavic minorities, bút Hungary was only a target in 
the last year of the war fór territory. Wilson stated on October 18, 1918, 
that his tenth point, “The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose piacé 
among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be 
accorded the freest opportunity to autonomous development,” was nőt 
valid anymore.
Another chapter of particular interest deals with the picture the 
American press painted about the Monarchy, in generál, and about 
Hungary, in particular. This is the fírst such study with which Glant 
wishes to pay off “the old debt of our historiography.” (103) He warns, 
however, that the sources are limited in numbers, their influence on public 
opinion and, in consequence, on foreign policy decision making was 
limited, and that the views of Hungary were often inextricably mixed with 
that of the Monarchy. Despite this fact, the main conclusion holds true 
that “the pre-war romantic and idealized view on Hungary went through a 
complete change and by 1918 it had become openly anti-Hungárián.” 
(104) The biggest positive influence, írom the Hungárián point of view, 
was due to Apponyi’s fi ve articles that were published in The New York 
Times. As the author puts it, “Apponyi single-handedly did more to win 
over the American public opinion than all the rest of the politicians and 
propagandists of the Central Powers together.” (107) The first two articles 
appeared in the Sunday edition, which was important because this edition 
held an exclusive piacé in the newspaper markét with huge circulations, 
sometimes close to a millión copies. His fervent anti-Russian views might 
have found receptive ears, bút his attack on American pseudo-neutrality
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pút an end to the possibility to publish widely and to his friendship with 
Theodore Roosevelt. In the end, Apponyi’s articles provided only a 
meager positive iníluence on American public opinion.
Although “Wilson did nőt make a single concrete step to ensure de 
facto American neutrality,” it is important to note that the American- 
British relations up until laté 1916 were strained. (82) In March 1915, the 
British issued the Reprisals Order of March, which basically ordered all 
ships of presumed enemy destination to be subject to seizure. The tug-of- 
war of differing opinions went on and by 1916 the relations had 
worsened. The reason fór the tension was mainly economic. On July 18, 
1916, the British government issued a blacklist of eighty-seven American 
firms (the üst alsó contained roughly 350 Latin American firms). These 
firms were accused or suspected of trading with the Central Powers. It 
was forbidden fór British subjects to have any dealings with these firms. 
Fury swept across the United States. As Acting Secretary of State Frank 
Polk wrote to Colonel House, “This blacklisting order of the English [...] 
is causing tremendous irritation and we will have to do something.” 
Wilson was perhaps the angriest, and his anger stemmed in part from the 
British rejection of the House-Grey Memorandum in 1915, which would 
have insured a possible cooperation between the two nations toward a 
peace favorable to Great Britain. On July 23rd, he wrote to House, “I am, 
I must admit, about at the end of my patience with Great Britain and the 
Allies. This black list business is the last straw... I am seriously 
considering asking Congress to authorize me to prohibit loans and restrict 
exportations to the Allies... Can we any longer endure their intolerable 
course?” A strong protest was sent to Britain on July 26th to which no 
answer arrived fór months. To embitter things further, despite a Senate 
resolution fór clemency, Britain hanged Sir Roger Casement, who had 
planned an Irish revolution against England. The Irish-Americans, in 
particular, were angry and their large numbers insured that public opinion 
of the British was negative.2
2 The quotations are from Arthur S. Link, Wilson: Campaigns fór Progressivism and 
Peace, 1916 1917 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965) 65, 66, 
and 67. Freshly reclcctcd In November 1916, Wilson was at the end of his patience 
with the British. If they wanted to fight the US, he said to House. “they could do this 
country no serious húrt.” May, Erncst R. The World War and American Isolation, 
1914-1917 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959) 362. The black list 
issuc rcmaincd a serious issue until the U.S. had deelared war on Germany. On April 
27, 1917, the London Gazette announced that the American firms were dropped from
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Going back to Hungary, American newspapermen sometimes 
referred to Hungarians as “clear thinking” and once it was written, “the 
typical Hungárián thinks of the Balkan nations as Europeans think of 
Africans.” (114, 1 12) It is of importance and gives a very useful tool in 
analyzing contemporary American public opinion that the three 
newspapermen that traveled to Budapest in 1916, the most famous of 
them was William Bullitt, who alsó met with the most important people, 
Tisza, Andrássy, and Apponyi, did nothing to disperse the clichés about 
Hungarians. If anything, they rather strengthened it.
The George Creel-led Committee on Public Information (CP1) alsó 
comes intő the limelight, bút we leam that, similarly to the generál press, 
concentrated almost exclusively on Germany. It did have a Hungárián 
office, which was headed by Sándor (Alexander) Konta, who was the 
president of the American Hungárián Loyalty League, bút it played no 
role whatsoever in the relations between the two countries. The biggest 
problem fór the Hungarians in the States was the question of loyalty to 
their new country. At the end of 1915, many Hungarian-Americans were 
subject to different atrocities in the wake of the Konstantin Theodore 
Dumba incident. When the ambassador of the Monarchy reported that 
Secretary of State William Jennings Bryant thought that the strong 
language in the Lnsitania notes was an effort to calm down American 
public opinion in the wake of the Lusitania’s deliberate sinking by a 
Germán U-boat. The content of the report got back to the United States 
and caused both the resignation of Bryant and the expulsion of Dumba.3 
After the incident, most Hungarians living in their new country tried to 
prove their loyalty. The CPI alsó tried to influence the immigrants 
through their own newspapers and tried, successfully, to make them buy 
war bonds, which was seen as a way of demonstrating loyalty. What is 
important about Wilson and the CPI is, as Glant rightly concludes, that “it 
was nőt the separatist campaign that convinced the president, bút it was 
the president who made the decision when and under what circumstances 
separatist views might be practiced in the United States.” (177) Thus, it 
was the President that controlled the situation.
Glant sets out to dethrone another myth, that of the political 
importance of the Inquiry, Wilson’s special group of experts who were to
it (Tliomas A. Bailey, ‘"The United States and the Black List During the Great War,” 
The Journal o f  Modern History, 6.1 (March, 1934): 32.)
Tliebeslbook onthe Lnsitania is Colin Simpson, Lusitania (London: Longman, 1972).
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plán the postwar map of Europe. As it turns out, the body was following 
Wilson’s ideas and although it came up with numerous suggestions, it had 
no policy making mandate. Still, its influence and significance cannot be 
avoided. The Inquiry’s last report was the most important írom the 
Hungárián point of view, and we leam that the new borders of Hungary 
were basically already written in May 1918. Therefore, another popular 
fallacy, the one that the Americans were “defenders” of Hungary and its 
territory at the Paris Peace Conference, is proved false. Instead, the report 
in May 1918, contemplated the loss of two millión Hungarians to the 
successor States and a Hungary of 112,000 square kilometers, only 
somewhat larger than the Treaty of Trianon ruled in the end. To be fair 
with the authors of that report, it States that such a plán “to piacé a large 
proportion of them [the Magyars] (nearly 25 percent) under the control of 
nationalistic groups whom they have regarded as serfs and inferiors 
would start violent irredentism and create future dissension and war.” 
(193) Since the Inquiry, and within it the Austro-Hungarian section, did 
nőt deem it important to have an expert on hand who would be intimate 
with the Hungárián point of view, Glant rightly concludes that “the work 
of the committee was biased from the start.” (196) The lack of 
comprehensive and practical plans fór the territory of the Monarchy 
meant the failure of the American “scientific peace” even before the war 
ended. (197) There was simply no chance to resolve the deep-seated 
ethnic problems by the stroke of a pen.
We alsó learn that the work of the State Department, the War 
Department, and the Army and Navy Intelligence had no reál effect on 
Wilson’s foreign policy decisions concerning the Monarchy either, and 
nőt even Colonel House had as much influence in this question as it is 
widely believed, nőt to mention the fact that Wilson's altér ego was 
indifferent to this region. The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and 
especially Hungary, stayed in the background, aside from the drive to see 
it dismembered. Neither the American minister in Vienna, Frederick C. 
Penfield, nor William Coffin, Consul-General in Budapest, dealt with or 
sent valuable reports about Hungary to the State Department.
The most interesting chapters, especially in light of the rest, are the 
ones that deal with Woodrow Wilson and his relation with Hungary and 
Hungarians. Glant tries to dismiss the old myth that Wilson did nőt like 
the Hungarians. Although he had negative statements about Hungárián 
immigrants before he became president, and he saw in Hungary a nation 
that thwarted the freedom of the Slavic minorities, it would be an
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overstatement that he was inimical to Hungary before or through World 
War I. Simply pút, he was nőt that interested in Hungary. The country did 
nőt deserve a distinct piacé on Wilson's political map. Fór the political 
scientist, the semi-theologian, or the believer in Anglo-Saxon institutional, 
and other type of, superiority, other countries were much more important. 
Evén if Wilson was more familiar with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy 
and its characteristics than most of his “experts” around him, it did nőt 
qualify him as an authority on Hungary, another household opinion Glant 
tries to disprove. Tt is crucial that Wilson made his foreign policy 
decisions on his own. The author, after immaculately summarizing 
Wilson's worldview, points out that the President’s policy toward the 
Habsburg Empire was in a State of flux till the spring of 1918. Until April 
1918, he had been, although in a dubious form, against the 
dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. However, by then 
the Russian Revolution had taken piacé, and the new and threatening 
ideology of Bolshevism with its implications fór the war against Germany 
created a new situation. According to Glant, it was the Czechoslovak 
Légion and the question of an independent Czechoslovak State that gave 
the turn-around fór Wilson, who had become convinced that his morál 
views and strategies fór a régiónál cooperation could be met in only this 
way. At the end of June, the dismemberment of the Habsburg Empire and 
the creation of small nation States were irrevocably decided by Wilson, 
thus joining his French and British counterparts. Unfortunately fór 
Hungary, the image of Hungary after this time became plainly negative. 
Wilson’s Central and East European policy was “unbalanced” and his 
handling of the Hungárián situation was “black and white.” (248)
Doiíble Prism is an important book. It examines a period in the 
relations between Americans and Hungarians that so far has nőt been 
examined thoroughly. Tibor Glant’s conclusions are convincing and the 
rich documentation of sources gives credence to these conclusions. What 
is particularly pleasing is the appendix in which one can see all the 
matériái conceming Hungary and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in the 
period: pamphlets and books issued and spread in the United States, the 
reports of the Tnquiry concerning Hungary, and the State Department’s 
and the lnquiry’s final plán of settlement, which clearly shows a lack of 
substantial knowledge bút ample reverberation of anti-Hungárián 
propaganda.
As Glant says in his afterword, the relations between the two 
countries reached a new phase with the Versailles Peace Conference and
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the Treaty of Trianon, which period lasíed till the summer of 1921, when 
the separate Peace Treaty between Washington and Budapest was signed. 
He promises to write a book on that period soon If he can keep up this 
clear-sighted approach, buttressed with rich archivál matériái, and reaches 
similarly important conclusions conceming the relations of the two 
nations, another important book will have been added to the growing 
literature of Hungárián-American relations.
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